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12 July 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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Laos: In reply to Vientiane's proposal that coalition talks be held in Luang Prabang, Pathet Lao leader Souphannouvong has suggested that the three princes resume talks in Namone. The government may, in turn, propose Phnom Penh as the site. Phoumi meanwhile is continuing his efforts to maintain some influence in the formation of a new government and outlined his position to the National Assembly on 11 July. [However, Boun Oum has gone to southern Laos for an indefinite stay and Phoumi is said to be planning a "campaign tour" there.]

[Minor skirmishing has continued in Xieng Khouang Province, and on 9 July government troops reoccupied Muong Bo, about 30 miles north of Pak Sane, encountering no resistance.]

(Backup, Page 1) (Map)

Nationalist China: [Chinese Nationalist officials, apprehensive over US policy in the Far East and the growing world sentiment in favor of "two Chinas," have recently intensified planning for a series of paramilitary operations against the mainland, claiming that such operations might spark a revolt against Communist rule. Lt. Gen. Chiang Ching-kuo, Nationalist security chief, on 3 July ordered that the screening of a 200-man special forces team to be airdropped into Kwangtung Province in South China be completed by mid-July. The Nationalists have previously carried out small-scale forays on the mainland. There appears to be a greater sense of urgency in these latest plans than has been apparent in the past. Even more extensive operations may be under consideration.]

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Communist China - North Korea: Peiping on 11 July signed a mutual defense pact with North Korea, virtually identical to the treaty the USSR had concluded with North Korea one week earlier on 6 July. Peiping, in an apparent effort to counter speculation of Sino-Soviet competition over Korea, is extolling the earlier pact as enhancing the "brotherly friendship and all-round cooperation" between Moscow and Pyongyang and depicting its new treaty as a contribution to bloc unity.

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Sudan: The Abboud military government has arrested twelve of the leaders of a political coalition which has been pressing for a return to civilian government in the Sudan. Those arrested and flown to the Juba area of southern Sudan for detention have been key figures in the Umma, National Unionist, and Communist parties--all of which have been technically illegal since the military regime took power in November 1958.

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Siddiq al-Mahdi, head of the Ansar religious sect and the most important coalition leader, evidently was not arrested, but several ranking Ansar figures including former Umma party Prime Minister Abdullah Khalil were imprisoned. The government probably remains wary of a direct move against the Mahdi himself which could provoke an uprising of several thousand Ansar tribal warriors and defection of a considerable number of Ansar adherents from the ranks of the Sudanese Army.

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Congo: Negotiations centering on the composition of a new government are continuing between representatives of the Leopoldville government and the Stanleyville regime. Belgian press reports that agreement has been reached on a coalition cabinet are unconfirmed; recent actions by the central government, however, indicate that it is attempting to accommodate Gizenga where

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possible. On 7 July, the central government acceded to a long-standing demand of Gizenga by returning to Stanleyville seven pro-Gizenga deputies who had been under detention in Leopoldville.

In Elisabethville, Tshombé used the occasion of Katanga's 11 July "Independence Day" to qualify his recent attacks on the Leopoldville government. Tshombé stated that Katanga favored "association" with the Congo, but implied that future "cooperation" did not extend to Katanga's subsidizing the Congo treasury.

Tshombé's recent remarks suggest that he is returning to the delaying tactics and positions of calculated ambiguity with which he effectively sought to neutralize moves toward Congo unity prior to his two months' incarceration in Leopoldville.

(Map)

Portugal-Angola-UN: Carlos Salamanca, Bolivian chairman of the UN subcommittee on Angola, is scheduled to go to Portugal about 15 July, principally in an effort to obtain Lisbon's permission for the full five-member committee to visit Angola. Lisbon is unlikely to grant his request. Salamanca will then have no alternative to seeking further action by the General Assembly or the Security Council, a step which would probably lead to an Afro-Asian call for UN sanctions against Portugal.

Turkey: About 65 percent of the Turks who voted in the referendum on 9 July approved the new constitution, according to unofficial and incomplete returns. The bulk of the negative votes came from provinces which had been strongholds of the Democratic party of former Premier Menderes before his ouster by the military coup in May 1960. The ruling Committee of National Unity (CNU) had hoped for overwhelming endorsement of the constitution. Barring serious disorders in the next few weeks,

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the CNU still is expected to carry out its promise to hold national elections in mid-October preparatory to returning the government to civilian control. The size of the vote against the constitution, however, will increase the CNU's apprehension over the amount of anti-government and pro-Democratic strength remaining in the country.

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Laos

[The Vientiane delegation succeeded in having representatives of the International Control Commission (ICC) seated at the Namone talks on 9 July, although opposition factions have not conceded in principle the right of the ICC to participate. Government delegates at Namone allegedly have noted that certain differences have arisen among members of the pro-Souvanna military delegation and are hoping to encourage some defections by supplying them food and luxury items unobtainable in Xieng Khouang. The Vientiane group is also trying to promote fears among Souvanna supporters that the Pathet Lao will "grab the lion's share" in any integration of opposition forces into the army.]

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[redacted] although Souphannouvong may go through the motions of integration in the event of a coalition government, he will maintain tight control of his military forces and the territory they hold. [redacted] at least half of the cabinet posts in the new government would have to be held by strong pro-Western figures to prevent Pathet Lao domination of the coalition and that the realistic alternatives are taking action now or losing control to the Communists.]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] numerous detachments of Vietnamese troops entering Laos by Route 7 since early 1961. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[REDACTED] Bloc airlift operations for the period 3 through 9 July involved an estimated total of 75 sorties for an estimated delivered cargo of 175 tons. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] no military supplies have been flown into Laos since early June. [REDACTED] the airlift is now carrying food, wounded personnel, couriers, and passengers to and from Hanoi. [REDACTED] substantial amounts of consumer-type goods were being flown into Laos for sale by local merchants.]

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Chinese Nationalists Intensify Plans for Mainland Paramilitary Operations

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[REDACTED] one 20-man special forces team would be ready to drop near Canton after 25 July and another in Fukien Province in October. [REDACTED] six teams of 20 to 30 men had been organized to be dropped at various locations on the mainland to collect intelligence and report to Taipei on the possibility of using larger Nationalist forces to exploit popular discontent.]

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[President Chiang Kai-shek's recent reshuffle of the general staff of the Ministry of National Defense indicates increased emphasis on plans to recover the mainland. Lt. Gen. Lo Ying-te, former chief of staff of the air force, was appointed deputy chief of the General Staff for Intelligence. Lt. Gen. Liu Lien-i was designated deputy for operations, and Lt. Gen. Tang Shou-chih was named vice chief of staff. All of these officers appear to have been chosen because of their competence in operational planning.]

[The Nationalists initiated plans in 1956 for a special airborne task force of 30,000 men to be dropped in small units on the mainland. To date about 30,000 infantry troops have received jump training in this program. Of these, 7,000 are assigned to special forces groups and to the airborne regiment, while the remaining 23,000 are assigned to various other army units. They have 5,000 American parachutes obtained under the Military Aid Program and 5,300 recently acquired Japanese parachutes]

[Senior Nationalist officials, including President Chiang, have repeatedly tried to convince American officials of the feasibility of fomenting an uprising on the mainland, and have attempted to enlist US support for an airborne operation by special forces. They have said that they preferred to act in concert with the United States but would act unilaterally if necessary. President Chiang reportedly told his three service chiefs recently that he probably would be unable to get prior]

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[American support for the planned operation, but that after Nationalist forces had established a bridgehead, the Americans would surely provide all necessary aid.]

[The Chinese Communists would almost certainly make a major effort to exploit any sizable Chinese Nationalist airdrop or sabotage campaign on the mainland by charging the US with complicity and by citing the action as further "proof" that the US is engaged in "aggressive" acts against Peiping.]

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Peiping Signs Defense Treaty With Pyongyang

The sequence of events during Kim Il-sung's visit to Moscow suggests that Peiping was quick to take the initiative to assure continuing Chinese Communist influence in North Korea. Foreign Minister Chen Yi was in Moscow en route home from the Geneva conference when the Soviet-Korean mutual defense treaty was announced. He conferred with Kim Il-sung the day of the signing, and on the following day it was announced that Kim would pay a visit to Peiping, although that city was not on his original itinerary. When Kim arrived in Peiping on 10 July, the Chinese turned out all their top leaders except Mao Tse-tung to give him a warm welcome, and a half-million flag-waving Chinese cheered him on his way from the airport to the city.

Both the pacts mention economic assistance, and it is possible that the Chinese, despite acute economic problems at home, may try to match the new aid which Kim got in Moscow. Soviet aid to North Korea has amounted to at least \$700,000,000, most of it for economic construction. Chinese economic aid has totaled about \$400,000,000, including a \$105,000,000 credit extended last fall. Moscow and Peiping also have provided North Korea with large-scale military assistance.

The new treaty, like the one with the USSR, endorses Pyongyang's reunification program. The Koreans have said this program is "inseparable" from Communist China's claim on Taiwan, but no reference to Taiwan was included in the treaty. In addition, both treaties include mutual pledges by the parties concerned not to take part in any action or bloc directed against the other.

For the North Koreans, the treaty with Moscow undoubtedly is the more significant, both from political and material points of view, but Peiping's promptness to join in a commitment to the North Koreans is likely to convince many in the Pyongyang regime--and perhaps other Asian Communists--that there is profit in Sino-Soviet competition. [REDACTED]

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